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This paper presents a general model of an exchange economy with con-
sumption externalities, and establishes the existence of equilibrium in the
model, under assumptions comparable to those in classical models. The key
aspect of the model is that the economy is described in distributional terms.
JEL Classiﬁcation D5
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The classical model of competitive markets assumes that each agent cares
only about his/her own consumption, but there has long been interest in
relaxing that assumption to allow for the possibility that agents care about
the consumption of others (consumption externalities) and even about prices
(price externalities). For the case of a ﬁnite number of agents, a satisfactory
model and a proof of existence of equilibrium in that model (with assumptions
comparable to the assumptions in classical models) have been known for
some time. (See Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) for a model and existence
proof, and Laﬀont (1977) for discussion and applications.) For the case of
a continuum of agents, however, a satisfactory model has proved elusive.
The issue has recently received increased attention: Balder (2000) identiﬁes
unexpected diﬃculties with previous models, and Noguchi (2001), Balder
(2003), and Cornet & Topuzu (2004) oﬀer models with a continuum of agents
and proofs of existence of equilibrium in those models — but only under
assumptions that are restrictive, or at least unpleasantly strong. (See below
for a discussion and comparison with the assumptions in this paper.)
In this paper, we oﬀer a simple, but quite general, model of an economy
with a continuum of agents and consumption externalities, and establish
the existence of equilibrium in that model, under assumptions comparable
to those in classical models.1 Our point of departure is that we describe
an economy in distributional terms as in Hart, Hildenbrand & Kohlberg
(1975), rather than in function-theoretic terms as in Aumann (1964, 1966).
Aside from some fussiness required to avoid circularity in the description of
agent characteristics and to deal with a space of agent characteristics that
is not metrizable, our model and existence proof are surprisingly clean and
straightforward.
It is useful to contrast our model and assumptions with those in the pa-
pers mentioned above. Out model, and all of those above, view consumer
1For simplicity, we focus here on consumption externalities, but there would be no diﬃ-
culty in allowing for price externalities as well, following Greenberg, Shitovitz & Wieczorek
(1979).
1preferences as depending on own consumption, taking the consumption of
others as a parameter. In the papers cited above, the consumption of others
is described by a function from the space consumer names to the space of
consumptions. In this paper, the consumption of others is described by a
distribution on the product of the space of consumer characteristics with the
space of consumptions. In terms of the dependence of preferences on own
consumption, Noguchi (2001) and Cornet & Topuzu (2004) require, in ad-
dition to the standard assumptions (continuity, anti-symmetry, irreﬂexivity,
transitivity, negative transitivity), that preferences be convex in own con-
sumption, while Balder (2003) assumes a rather general functional form but
does not require convexity. In this paper, we make only the standard assump-
tions about preferences for own consumption. In terms of the dependence of
preferences on the consumption of others, Noguchi (2001) requires that con-
sumers care only about the mean consumption of others, Cornet & Topuzu
(2004) requires that preferences be continuous with respect to the topology
of weak convergence of social allocations (as we illustrate in Section 4, this is
a very strong requirement when allocations are described as functions from
consumer names to consumption bundles), while Balder (2003) requires that
the social allocation enters into the preferences of every consumer in exactly
the same way. In this paper, we allow preferences to depend rather arbitrarily
on the consumption of others, and we allow this dependence to be diﬀerent
for each consumer, and we require only that preferences be continuous with
respect to the topology of weak convergence of distributions (as we illustrate
in Section 4, this is a rather weak requirement).
However, we should oﬀer a word of caution about our distributional frame-
work: When agents care only about their own consumption, the number of
commodities is ﬁnite, and commodities are divisible, the function-theoretic
description of an economy and the distributional description of an economy
are “almost” equivalent, in the sense that every function-theoretic descrip-
tion of an economy gives rise to a distributional description of an economy,
any two function-theoretic descriptions that give rise to the same distribu-
tional description give rise to sets of Walrasian equilibrium distributions that
have the same closure, and every Walrasian equilibrium distribution of an
economy arises from some function-theoretic description. Hence, the choice
2to describe an economy with a ﬁnite number of divisible commodities in
function-theoretic terms or in distributional terms is largely one of taste
and convenience. However, when agents care about the consumption of oth-
ers, or when the number of indivisible commodities is inﬁnite, the situation
is diﬀerent: although every well-behaved distributional economy admits an
equilibrium, not every well-behaved function-theoretic economy admits an
equilibrium. (See Mas-Colell (1986) and Gretsky, Ostroy & Zame (1982) for
the case of inﬁnitely many indivisible economies and Balder (2003) for the
case of externalities.)
Following this Introduction, we present the model in Section 2 and the
existence theorem and its proof in Section 3. Section 4 presents several simple
examples that illustrate our assumptions.
32 The Economy with Externalities
For X a completely regular topological space2 we write B(X) for the family
of Borel subsets of X. By a measure on X we always mean a ﬁnite, positive,
countably additive measure σ on B(X) that is regular, in the sense that for
each Borel set B and each ε > 0 there are a closed set F ⊂ B and an open
set U ⊃ B such that σ(U \ F) < ε. The norm, or total mass of a measure
σ, is kνk = ν(X). A probability measure or distribution on X is a measure
having total mass 1. We write M(X)+ for the space of measures on X and
Prob(X) ⊂ M(X)+ for the subspace of probability measures. We equip both
M(X)+ and Prob(X) with the topology of weak convergence: σα → σ weakly




for all bounded continuous functions ϕ : X → R. (The assumption of com-
plete regularity of X guarantees that M(X)+ is a Hausdorﬀ space.)
We consider economies with L ≥ 1 perfectly divisible consumption goods,
so the commodity space and price space are both RL. It is convenient to
normalize prices to sum to 1; write
∆ = {p ∈ R
L :
X
p` = 1,p ≥ 0}
for the simplex of normalized, positive prices and
∆ = {p ∈ R
L :
X
p` = 1,p  0}
for the simplex of normalized, strictly positive prices.
We allow agent preferences to depend on the consumption of others. (It
would be entirely straightforward to allow for preferences to depend on prices
as well.) Because we describe the economy in distributional terms, the most
obvious way to formalize this idea is to parametrize agent preferences by a
distribution on the product of the space of consumer characteristics with the
2Recall that a topological space X is completely regular if a) points are closed, and b)
for each closed subset Y ⊂ X and each point z ∈ X \ Y there is a continuous function
ϕ : X → [0,1] such that ϕ(z) = 1 and ϕ(y) = 0 for each y ∈ Y .
4space of consumptions. However, because consumer characteristics include
preferences, this obvious approach leads to a circularity. In order to avoid
this circularity, we follow the approach suggested by Mas-Colell (1984): we
take as given an abstract space of observable characteristics and parametrize
agent preferences by a distribution on the product of the space of observable
characteristics with the space of consumptions.
Formally, we take as given a complete separable metric space T and a
probability measure τ on T. We view T as the space of observable character-
istics of agents and τ as the distribution of observable characteristics in the
actual economy.
Agents care about their own consumption and about the consumptions
of others. Because we assume consumptions are non-negative, we can sum-
marize the consumptions of others as a distribution in Prob(T × RL
+). It is
conceivable that agents care about all possible distributions of consumptions
of others, but it is only necessary for our purposes that agents care about
those distributions that involve a ﬁnite amount of total resources, shared
among the actual population. To identify the relevant distributions, we say
that σ ∈ Prob(T ×RL
+) is integrable if
R
|x|dσ < ∞. We write D for the set of
integrable distributions and D(τ) for the subset of integrable distributions σ
for which the marginal of σ on T is τ. With the topology of weak convergence,
Prob(T ×RL
+) is a complete metric space; we give D(τ) ⊂ Prob(T ×RL
+) the
relative topology.
As in Hildenbrand (1974), we write P∗ for the space of (continuous, anti-
symmetric, irreﬂexive, transitive, negatively transitive) preference relations
on RL
+ and P∗
mo ⊂ P∗ for the subspace of strictly monotone preference rela-
tions. In the topology of closed convergence, P∗ and P∗
mo and are completely
metrizable. We shall assume that preferences are strictly monotone in own
consumption, so we deﬁne a preference relation with consumption externali-
ties to be a map
R : D(τ) → P
∗
mo
We use interchangeably the notations (x,y) ∈ R(σ) or xR(σ)y to mean that
the consumption bundle x is preferred to the consumption bundle y when σ
5is the distribution of consumption.3 As usual, the preference relation R is





+ × D(τ) : xR(σ)y}
is open. The following Proposition shows that continuity of the preference
relation R in this sense is equivalent to continuity of the mapping R; the
simple proof is left to the reader.
Proposition The mapping R : D(τ) → P∗
mo is continuous if and only if





+ × D(τ) : xR(σ)y}
is open.4
Write R∗
mo for the space of continuous preference relations, and give R∗
mo
the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets.5 A subbase for this
topology consists of all sets of the form
W(K,U) = {R ∈ R
∗
mo : R(K) ⊂ U}
where K ⊂ D(τ) is compact and U ⊂ P∗ is open.
Agents are characterized by an observable characteristic, a preference
relation, and an endowment, so the space of agent characteristics is





3The restriction to integrable distributions of consumption is analogous to the restric-
tion, in the function-theoretic formulations of Noguchi (2003), Balder (2003) and Cornet
& Topuzu (2004), to allocations that are integrable with respect to the given population
measure.
4Strict monotonicity is important here.
5Again: we could insist that preferences be deﬁned even for distributions of consump-
tions that involve an inﬁnite amount of total resources, or are shared among a population
diﬀerent from the actual population, but it is only necessary for our purposes that pref-
erences be deﬁned for distributions that involve a ﬁnite amount of total resources, shared
among the actual population. Thus, the formulation we have chosen has the advantage of
being more general and no less complicated.
6(We will show in the following section that R∗
mo and C are completely regu-
lar.) Following Hart, Hildenbrand & Kohlberg (1975), an economy is a tight
probability measure λ on T×R∗
mo×RL
+ whose marginal on T is the given pop-
ulation measure τ and for which aggregate endowment is ﬁnite:
R
e`dλ < ∞
for each `. (Recall that a measure λ on a completely regular space X is tight
if for every ε > 0 there is a compact set K ⊂ X such that λ(X \ K) < ε.
Billingsley (1968) shows that every measure on a complete, separable metric
space is tight. However, the space R∗
mo of preference relations and the space
C of agent characteristics are not metrizable, so we build the requirement of
tightness into our description of the economy.)
An equilibrium for the economy λ is a price p ∈ ∆ and a probability




(a) the marginal of µ on T × R∗
mo × RL
+ is λ
(b) almost all agents choose in their budget set:
µ{(t,R,e,x) : p · x > p · e} = 0




(Note that (a) and (c) imply that the marginal µ14 of µ on T ×RL
+ (the
distribution of consumption) belongs to D(τ).)
(d) almost all agents optimize given the price p and the distribution of
consumption µ14:
µ{(t,R,e,x) : y ∈ R
L
+,yR(µ14)x ⇒ p · y > p · e} = 0
73 Existence of Equilibrium
Our main result is:
Theorem Let (T,τ) be a population and let λ ∈ Prob(T × R∗
mo × RL
+) be
an economy (i.e, a tight probability measure whose marginal on T is τ and
for which
R
e`dλ < ∞ for each `). If 0 <
R
e`dλ for each ` (i.e., each good
is present in the aggregate), then the economy λ admits an equilibrium.
Before beginning the proof, it is convenient to collect some preliminary
results. Recall that a family S ⊂ M(X)+ of measures is uniformly tight if for
each ε > 0 there is a compact set K such that σ(X \K) < ε for each σ ∈ S.
The two lemmas below record extensions to the case of completely regular
spaces of familiar facts about separable metric spaces (see Billingsley (1968)
for example); we oﬀer proofs here for convenience (but claim no originality).
Lemma 1 If X is a completely regular topological space and {σα} is a uni-
formly tight net of measures converging weakly to the measure σ then
(i) σ(F) ≥ limsupσα(F) for every closed set F ⊂ X
(ii) σ is tight
Proof Fix a closed set F and suppose, for the purpose of obtaining a
contradiction, that σ(F) < limsupσα(F). Choose ε > 0 so that
σ(F) < limsupσα(F) − 3ε
Because {σα} is uniformly tight, there is a compact set K such that
σα(X \ K) < ε for each α. Write L = F ∩ K. Note that σα(L) > σα(F) − ε
for each α. Because σ is positive, σ(F) ≥ σ(L). Use regularity of σ to choose
an open set U ⊃ L such that σ(U) < σ(L) + ε. Use complete regularity of
8X to choose a continuous function Φ : X → [0,1] such that Φ|L ≡ 1 and





On the other hand
σα(F) − ε ≤ σα(L) ≤
R
Φdσα R
Φdσ ≤ σ(L) + ε ≤ σ(F) + ε
Putting these together yields
limsupσα(F) ≤ σ(F) + 2ε
This is a contradiction, so we obtain (i).






Fix ε > 0 and choose a compact set K ⊂ X such that
σα(X) − σα(K) = σα(X \ K) ≤ ε
for each α. In view of (i) we have
σ(K) ≥ limsupσα(K) ≥ limsupσα(X) − ε = σ(X) − ε
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that σ is tight.
Lemma 2 If X is a completely regular topological space then every norm
bounded and uniformly tight family of measures S ⊂ M(X)+ is relatively
weakly compact.
6To construct such a function, note ﬁrst that for each x ∈ L there is a continuous
function ψx : X → [0,1] such that ψx(x) = 0 and ψx|(X \ U) ≡ 1. For each x ∈ L, set
Vx = {y ∈ X : ψx(y) < 1
2}. Compactness of L entails that the covering {Vx} of L has
a ﬁnite subcover, so we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite family of continuous functions ψi : X → [0,1]
such that (a) for each x ∈ L there is some i for which ψi(x) < 1
2, (b) ψi|(X \ U) ≡ 1
for each i. Set Ψ =
Q
ψi, so that Ψ(x) < 1
2 for each x ∈ K and Ψ|F ≡ 1. Then deﬁne
Φ = 2 − 2max{1
2,Ψ}.
9Proof It suﬃces to prove that every net in S contains a convergent subnet.
To this end, let {σα} be a net in S. By assumption, there is an M > 0 such
that σ(X) ≤ M for each σ ∈ S. For each integer n, use uniform tightness to
choose a compact set Kn ⊂ X such that σ(X\Kn) < 1/n for each σ ∈ S. For
each n, {σα|Kn} is a net of measures in M(Kn)+ each of which has total mass
bounded by M. Because norm bounded balls in M(Kn)+ are weakly compact
(see Dunford & Schwartz (1957) for example), the net {σα|Kn} contains a
weakly convergent subnet. By a familiar diagonal argument, there is a single
subnet {σβ} of σα with the property that {σβ|Kn} is weakly convergent for
each n; say σβ|Kn → σn ∈ M(Kn)+. Note that σn ≤ σn+1|Kn, so if we view
each σn as a measure on X, then σn ≤ σn+1. Set σ = supn σn. That is, for




Straightforward calculations show that σ ∈ M(X)+ and that σβ → σ weakly,
so the proof is complete.
Finally, we prove, as promised in Section 2, that R∗
mo is a completely
regular space. Since metric spaces are completely regular and products of
completely regular spaces are completely regular, it follows that the space
T ×R∗
mo×RL




of characteristics and consumptions are also completely regular.
Lemma 3 The space R∗
mo of consumer preference relations is a completely
regular topological space.
Proof Fix a metric ρ on P∗. To see that points are closed, ﬁx R0 ∈ R∗
mo
and let R1 ∈ R∗
mo be any other point. Since R0 6= R1, there is some σ ∈ D(τ)
such that R0(σ) 6= R1(σ), whence ρ(R0(σ),R1(σ)) > 0. Let U be the ε-ball
around R1(σ) in P∗. Then W(σ,U) is an open set that contains R1 and not
R0. Since R1 is arbitrary, we conclude that R0 is closed, as desired.
To see that a point and a closed set can be separated by a function,
let F ⊂ R∗
mo be a closed set and let R0 ∈ R∗
mo be any point not in F.
10By deﬁnition, there are compact subsets K1,...Km ⊂ D(τ) and open sets
U1,...,Um ⊂ P∗ such that
R0 ∈ W(K1,U1) ∩ ... ∩ W(Km,Um)
and
W(K1,U1) ∩ ... ∩ W(Km,Um) ∩ F = ∅
Let ρ be any metric on P∗ that deﬁnes the topology, and use compactness
of R0(K) to choose an ε > 0 suﬃciently small that, for each i, Ui contains
the ε-ball around every point of R0(Ki). Set K = K1 ∪ ... ∪ Km and deﬁne
ϕ : R∗
mo → [0,1] by









It is easily checked that ϕ is continuous, that ϕ(R0) = 1, and that ϕ(R) = 0
for each R ∈ F, as desired.
With these preliminaries in hand, we proceed to the proof of the Theorem
Proof of Theorem The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1 Tightness of λ entails that there is an increasing sequence {Hi} of
compact subsets of T × R∗
mo × RL
+ such that λ(Hi) > 1 − 2−i for each i. For
each n,i, set




Kn = {(t,R,e,x) : |x| ≤ 2Ln|e|}
Kni = {(t,R,e,x) ∈ Kn : (t,R,e) ∈ Hi}
Fn = {µ ∈ Prob(Kn) : µ123 = λ}
(where µ123 is the marginal of µ on the ﬁrst three factors).
We assert that each Fn is non-empty, convex, and weakly compact. To
see that Fn is non-empty, write











11for the projection on the ﬁrst three factors. For B ⊂ Kn a Borel set, write








Now deﬁne a probability measure µ ∈ Prob(Kn) by µ(B) = λ(proj(B0)),
and note that µ ∈ Fn, so Fn is non-empty. It is obvious that Fn is convex
and that it is weakly closed. Moreover, µ(Kni) > 1−2−i for each µ ∈ Fn, so
Fn is uniformly tight, hence compact.
Step 2 For (t,R,e) ∈ T × R∗
mo × RL




that µ14 ∈ D(τ) (µ14 is the marginal of µ on the product of the ﬁrst and
fourth factors), and p ∈ ∆, deﬁne individual budget and demand sets by:
β(t,R,e;µ,p) = {x ∈ R
L
+ : p · x ≤ p · e}
d(t,R,e;µ,p) = {x ∈ β(t,R,e;µ;p) : yR(µ14)x ⇒ p · y > p · e}
Finally, let D(µ,p) be the set of agents who choose in their demand set:
D(µ,p) = {(t,R,e,x) : x ∈ d(t,R,e;µ,p)}
For each n, deﬁne correspondences
φn : ∆n × Fn → Fn
ψn : ∆n × Fn → ∆n
Fn : ∆n × Fn → ∆n × Fn
as follows:









: q ∈ ∆n

Fn(p,µ) = ψn(p,µ) × φn(p,µ)
We claim that φn,ψn,Fn are upper-hemi-continuous, and have compact, con-
vex, non-empty values.
12It is evident that φn has convex values. Because ∆n,Fn are compact, to
see that φn is upper-hemi-continuous and has compact values, it suﬃces to
show that it has closed graph. To this end, let {(pα,µα)} be a net in ∆n×Fn
converging to (p,µ); for each α, let να ∈ φn(pα,µα) and assume να → ν. We
must show ν ∈ φn(p,µ). By assumption, να(D(µα,pα)) = 1. It follows that
να(D(µα,pα) ∩ Kni) = λ(Hi)
for each i. Set
Li = limsup[D(µα,pα) ∩ Kni]
If V is a closed neighborhood of Li then V ⊃ D(µα,pα)∩Kni for suﬃciently
large α. In view of Lemma 1, it follows that
ν(V ) ≥ limsupνα(V ) ≥ limsupνα [D(µα,pα) ∩ Kni] = λ(Hi)
Because V is arbitrary, it follows that ν(Li) ≥ λ(Hi). On the other hand,
the usual argument for upper-hemi-continuity of demand shows that
Li = limsup[D(µα,pα) ∩ Kni] ⊂ D(µ,p) ∩ Kni
It follows that ν(D(µ,p) ∩ Kni) = λ(Hi) and hence that ν(D(µ,p)) = 1, so
that ν ∈ φn(p,µ). We conclude that φn has closed graph, as desired.
To see that φn has non-empty values, ﬁx (p,µ). Because Hi is compact,

















k ) ∈ Hi
For each yαi


















For each n,i, ναi is a measure on Kni of total mass equal to λ(Hi). The
net {ναi} is uniformly tight, hence has a convergent subnet; the limit of this
subnet belongs to φn(p,µ). Hence φn(p,µ) is not empty, as asserted.
13That ψn is upper-hemi-continuous, and has compact, convex, non-empty
values follows immediately from the usual argument for Berge’s Maximum
Theorem.
Finally, Fn is upper-hemi-continuous, and has compact, convex, non-
empty values because φn,ψn enjoy these properties.
Step 3 Because ∆n,Fn are compact and convex and Fn is upper-hemi-
continuous and has compact, convex, non-empty values, Fn has a ﬁxed point
(pn,µn). By deﬁnition, pn maximizes the value of excess demand at pn,µn.
However, Walras’s Law guarantees that the value of excess demand at pn,µn
is 0. Hence, if q = ( 1
L,..., 1






































|x|dµn ≤ M; that is, total demand for all
goods (and hence for each good separately) is bounded by M, independently
of n.
Step 4 We construct a limit point of some subnet of the sequence {(pn,µn)}.
14To this end, deﬁne for each k,i:
Gk = {(t,R,e,x) : |x| > k}
Vi = {(t,R,e,x) : (t,R,e) ∈ Hi}








By construction, the marginal of µn on T × R∗
mo × RL
+ is λ, so





for each n,k,i. Because each Lki is compact, this means that {µn} is a
uniformly tight family, so some subnet of {µn} converges. Because prices pn
lie in the closed price simplex ∆, some subsequence of prices also converges.
Hence some subnet {(pα,µα)} of {(pn,µn)} converges; call the limit (p∗,µ∗).7
Note that p∗ ∈ ∆ and that µ∗
14 ∈ D(τ).
Step 5 We claim that p∗ ∈ ∆; that is, no component of p∗ is 0. If not,
assume without loss that the ﬁrst component of p∗ is strictly positive. Let
E = {(t,R,e) : e1 > 0}. Because
R
edλ > 0 it follows that λ(E) > 0.
Because λ is regular and tight, it follows that there is a compact set J ⊂ E
such that λ(J) > 0.
Deﬁne











Arguing as above, we see that Z is weakly closed and uniformly tight, hence




+) is not metrizable, {(pn,µn)} might not contain a
convergent subsequence.
15on Z. Precisely, we claim: For every A > 0 there is an integer n0 such
that if n ≥ n0, (t,R,e) ∈ J and ζ ∈ Z and y ∈ d(t,R,e;ζ,pn) then |y| >
A. To see this, suppose not. Then there is some A > 0 such that for
every n0 there is some n > n0, some (t,R,e) ∈ J, some ζ ∈ Z and some
yn ∈ d(t,R,e;ζ,pn) such that |yn| ≤ A. Letting n0 tend to inﬁnity, passing
to limits of subnets where necessary, and recalling that J,Z are compact,
that preference relations are continuous in the distribution of consumption,
and that the topology on R∗
mo is that of uniform convergence on compact
sets, and making use of the familiar argument for upper-hemi-continuity of
demand, we ﬁnd (t∗,R∗,e∗) ∈ Z, ζ∗ ∈ J and y∗ ∈ d(t∗,R∗,e∗;ζ∗,p∗) such
that |y∗| ≤ A. However, since (t∗,R∗,e∗) has non-zero wealth at prices p∗,
the price of the last good is 0, and preferences are strictly monotone, this is
absurd. This contradiction establishes the claim.





/λ(J) to conclude that there is an
n0 such that for every (t,R,e) ∈ J, each n ≥ n0 and every y ∈ d(t,R,e;ζ,pn)
we have:
|y| > 2
   
Z
edλ
   /λ(J)
If follows in particular that
Z
J
inf{|y| : y ∈ d(t,R,e;µn,pn)}dλ ≥ 2
   
Z
edλ
   









so we have obtained a contradiction. We conclude that p∗ ∈ ∆, as asserted.
Step 6 Because p∗ ∈ ∆, it follows that there is some n0 such that pn ∈ int∆n
for all n ≥ n0. By construction, pn maximizes the value of excess demand
among all prices in ∆n. Because the maximizer lies in the interior of ∆n,
it follows that the value of excess demand must be constant for all prices
in ∆n, and hence that excess demand must actually be 0. It is immediate,
therefore, that (pn,µn) is actually an equilibrium for the economy λ, provided
that n ≥ n0, so the proof is complete.
164 Examples
Some simple examples may help to illustrate the meaning and generality of
our assumptions.
The ﬁrst example is very much in the spirit of Balder (2003). Take
T = [0,1] and let τ be Lebesgue measure. Let









be a continuous function. For x ∈ RL
+,µ ∈ Prob(T × RL
+), deﬁne the utility







It is easily checked that u is jointly continuous (giving Prob(T × RL
+) the
topology of weak convergence). If v is strictly increasing in x (own consump-
tion) then so is u. Hence the utility function u induces a preference relation
with consumption externalities R : D(τ) → P∗
mo deﬁned by
R(µ) = {(x,x
0) : u(x,µ) > u(x
0,µ)}
It is easy to check that the preference relation R satisﬁes all our assumptions.
(Indeed, R is deﬁned and continuous on the entire space of distributions on
T × RL
+, not just on the subspace D(τ) of integrable distributions whose
marginal is τ.) Note that utility is a function of own consumption and an
average of some function of social consumption.
It may be enlightening to contrast this example with an example in the
spirit of Cornet & Topuzu (2004). As above, take T = [0,1] and let τ be
Lebesgue measure. Let







17be continuous functions. Given x ∈ RL
+ (own consumption) and an integrable
function f : T → RL




Thus utility is again a function of own consumption and an average of a func-
tion of social consumption. If w is strictly increasing in x (own consumption)
then so is u. However, if w is not a constant function, then in order that u be
continuous with respect to the topology of weak convergence of allocations,
as required by Cornet & Topuzu (2004), it is necessary and suﬃcient that ψ
be an aﬃne function. Requiring that ψ be aﬃne amounts to requiring that
utility be a function of own consumption and an average of a weighting of
social consumption, rather than an average of an arbitrary function of social
consumption, as above.
The examples above share the feature that utility is separable in own
consumption and social consumption, but a simple variant allows for non-
separability. Again, take T = [0,1] and let τ be Lebesgue measure. Let
Φ : R
L


























whenever 1 ≤ ` ≤ L,n+1 ≤ i ≤ n+L. (Note that this condition is satisﬁed
in the ﬁrst example because
∂φ
∂x` = 0 for each `.) If U is strictly monotone in
x then it induces a preference relation with consumption externalities





0) : U(x,µ) > U(x
0,µ)}
This preference relation satisﬁes our assumptions. (Indeed, R is continuous
on the whole space of distributions on T × RL
+, not just on the space D(τ)
of integrable distributions whose marginal is τ.)
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